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Abstract: 
Issue salience and ideological disagreement often predict coalition government 
behavior. However, research on portfolio allocation has yet to fully specify the complex 
relationship between issue salience, disagreement and coalition negotiations. Scholars 
treat issue salience and disagreement as distinct and disconnected, despite evidence 
that they work together and with conditional effects in a range of settings. Following a 
ORJLFRISRUWIROLRWUDGHVRU¶ORJUROOV·Ze propose that the relative salience of issues and 
disagreements at the issue level within the coalition both moderate the effect of issue 
salience on portfolio allocation. Using data drawn from the Parliamentary Democracy 
Data Archive, we find compelling evidence for our theory that links party manifestos to 
portfolio allocation. Consistent with a story on the conditional effect of salience and 
disagreement, we find evidence that the effect of salience is mitigated by the extent of 
disagreement between coalition parties. 
 
Key Words: Issue Salience, Issue Disagreement, most salient, portfolio allocation, 
coalition governance
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Ideological disagreement and issue salience play important roles in government 
outcomes. Scholars show WKDWWKHLQWHUDFWLRQRISDUWLHV·LVVXHSULRULWLHVDQGSROLF\
positions influence party behaviors such as coalition duration (Laver and Shepsle 1996; 
Bनck et al. 2011) and oversight (Falcó-Gimeno 2012). However, analyses have yet to 
fully consider the ways that salience and position jointly impact coalition bargaining. 
Extreme positions on salient issues pose a quandary for coalition governments; parties 
seek to avoid delegating policy to ideologically distant parties, yet these are the issues 
parties likely desire most. Extreme positions on issues may pose less of a problem for 
negotiations if parties place little emphasis on them. If a party holds an issue more 
salient than others and is ideologically distant on that issue, it may be unwilling to join 
a coalition in which it delegates policy on this portfolio. How do potential coalitions 
adjudicate this dilemma?  
Although substantial research examines how many cabinet positions each party 
receives in coalitions, less research explains who received which portfolio and why. 
Building on Budge and Keman (1990) and Laver and Shepsle (1996), Bनck et al. (2011) 
demonstrate that issue salience plays a key role in this process; parties likely control the 
portfolios salient in their election platforms. Yet, we argue that salience alone only 
signals the strength of SDUWLHV·SULRULWLHVWe extend their approach in two major ways; 
first, we incorporate ideological disagreement at the issue level and second we consider 
the extent to which relative salience within coalitions matter. We further posit that 
disagreement, absolute salience and relative salience are conditional. Following a 
bargaining logic based on a legislative logroll (see also de Marchi and Laver 2016), we 
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hypothesize that the SDUWLHV·position and salience on issues relative to others involved 
in coalition negotiations indicates the willingness of coalition partners to forego 
portfolios in coalition negotiations. Assuming that portfolios are policy management 
positions, parties are unlikely to bargain away portfolios on issues they hold most 
salient, particularly LIWKH\DUHLGHRORJLFDOO\GLVWDQWIURPWKHFRDOLWLRQ·V negotiated 
position on that issue.   
Using evidence from thirteen West European countries from 1948 to 1998, we 
propose two measures that account for issue level disagreement and relative salience. 
We demonstrate that issue level disagreement among potential partners and the 
salience of an issue to each party matter for portfolio allocation using data from the 
Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) (Volkens et al. 2011) and the Parliamentary 
Democracy Data Archive (Strøm et al. 2008). Parties holding the issue more salient than 
any other coalition party benefit the most. The level of issue salience is less important 
when there is greater disagreement on that issue and another party holds it as more 
salient.   
 
Theory 
Government formation research emphasizes bargaining over the allocation of 
cabinet posts among coalition partners (Warwick and Drukman 2001; Druckman and 
Warwick 2005; Proksch and Slapin 2006; Carroll and Cox 2007; Bäck et al. 2011) or 
among factions within parties (Mershon 2001a, 2001b). Most of this research assumes 
that cabinet portfolios are valuable to parties as the rewards of office. Although both 
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disagreement (Laver and Shepsle 1996) and salience (Bäck et al. 2011) play an important 
role in these studies, less research directly considers the moderating relationship 
between salience and disagreement on portfolio allocation. We argue that the relative 
salience of issues to coalition parties and their ideological distance signify both the cost 
that coalition parties forego in policy concessions to potential coalition partners as well 
as how important those policy costs are to each party.  
 Research on disagreement in coalition formation and termination has taken 
numerous forms. Axelrod (1970) argued that governing coalitions should be 
ideologically connected or not exclude any party contained within the ideological range 
of the coalition. While both size and ideological distance between coalition parties 
influence the likelihood that a coalition forms (Franklin and Mackie 1984; Laver and 
Shepsle 1996; Laver and Schofield 1998; Strøm et al. 2008), there is mixed evidence that 
disagreements cause coalition failures. Warwick (1994) argues that disagreement causes 
coalitions to terminate pre-maturely as they are incapable of developing legislation. 
Indeed, this relationship holds strongest empirically accounting for issue diversity in 
parties· platforms (Greene 2016).  
 Furthermore, ideological proximity can drive intra-party decisions about cabinet 
portfolio assignments (Kam et al. 2010; Ceron 2013; Greene and Jensen 2016) and 
cabinet reshuffles (Kam and Indridason 2005; Indridason and Kam 2008). Relatedly, 
Dewan and Hortala Vallve (2011) argue that prime ministers prefer to assign portfolios 
to a diverse cabinet in a multi-dimensional issue space. De Marchi and Laver (2016) 
show formally that coalition allocation follows a logic akin to a legislative logroll, where 
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parties trade portfolios across diverse interests. Prime ministers use cabinet assignments 
and reshuffles to combat intra-party and electoral threats to their leadership (Kam et al. 
2010). We add that in contexts requiring coalition governments, salience and 
disagreement on issues  jointly predict outcomes of the formation process. 
 As the rewards for joining a coalition (Laver and Shepsle 1996), potential 
coalition partners seek portfolios on which they hold strong preferences for policy (Bೂck 
et al. 2011) and office motives (Warwick and Druckman 2006). As the party in 
parliament with the first opportunity to propose a coalition, the formateur party likely 
seeks to find ideologically close partners on the most important dimensions of conflict. 
Formateur parties may seek coalition partners with ideological similarities, but hold 
different issues salient to allow for policy trades or logrolls. This guarantees the 
formateur SDUW\·VGRPLQDQFHRILWVPRVWSUHIHUUHGSRUWIROLRV 
From this perspective, the formateur identifies ideologically similar parties and 
offers portfolios to those parties based on their salient issues (Laver 1998).1  Yet, pDUWLHV·
choice to accept a coalition offer depends on their payoff in policy and portfolios. Policy 
negotiations lead to an agreement on a common position on the issues they include in 
their platforms where drift from this position might lead to coalition termination 
(Warwick 1994; Tsebelis 2002)*LYHQWKDWSDUWLHV·FRPSURPLVHon some policies to be in 
a coalition, we theorize that the formateur·VSURSRVDOZLOOEHXQOLNHO\WRRIIHUFDELQHW
positions to extreme parties on an issue that also hold it in high salience. Instead, the 
SURSRVDOZLOOPLQLPL]HSROLF\GULIWIURPWKHFRDOLWLRQ·VSosition through the proposed 
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ministers. The formateur·VSURSRVDOSRZHUVVKRXOGUHGXFHSROLF\GHYLDWLRQVIURPWKH
FRDOLWLRQ·VQHJRWLDWHGSRVLWLRQSDUWLFXODUO\ZKHQSDUWLHVKROGLVVXHVKLJKO\VDOLHQW 
From an issue focused approach, however, coalition negotiations depend not only on 
the formateur, but also WKHSDUWQHUV· preferences. Parties that prioritize the environment 
or immigration, for example, will make participation in a coalition conditional on 
controlling these portfolios. Budge and Keman (1990), for example, show that the issues 
traditionally important to a party influence coalition behavior. Bäck et al. (2011) add 
WKDWSDUWLHV·SUHIHUHQFHVEDVHGRQKLVWRULFDOSDUW\IDPLO\DQGWKHVDOLHQFHRILVVXHVLQ
their platforms predict the portfolios they receive. Furthermore, in their study of 
German Land governments, Raabe and Linhart (2013) show that parties seek portfolios 
in areas that are more salient to them.  
While they make a strong case for issue salience (Bäck et al. 2011), they treat 
coalitions as if portfolios are salient to only a single party. This may be the case under 
some settings, but more  often  multiple parties hold a portfolio salient. It is unlikely 
that the issues salient to each party easily sort themselves into distinct portfolios 
without overlapping interests.   We propose that the effect of issue salience depends on 
the relative salience amongst coalition members. We argue that if a party places greater 
salience on an issue than other partners, the potential coalition parties may be more 
willing to agree to requests for that particular portfolio. For example, both the German 
Green Party and the Social Democratic Party during the 1998 election discussed the 
issue of environmental protection in their manifestos (6.9% and 3.1%). While neither 
party dedicated a large amount of attention, the higher salience levels for the Greens 
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likely increased their chance of gaining the environmental minister. Therefore, the 
Greens should see the environmental portfolio as representing a greater share of the 
potential value of the coalition and be more willing to abandon negotiations if they do 
not get it. We predict that the effect of salience should be amplified for parties that hold 
an issue most salient. 
 
H1: Holding an issue more salient than any other coalition partner increases the 
effect of issue salience on the likelihood that the corresponding portfolio will be 
assigned to that party. 
 
Our discussion has yet to directly consider the role of ideological disagreement. 
Laver and Shepsle (1996) add that ideological disagreement influences the parties 
included in coalitions. From their perspective parties avoid coalitions with ideologically 
distant rivals and hold greater bargaining power when they are near the ideological 
center of multiple dimensions.  
Research on issue salience finds that parties receive portfolios linked to 
prominent issues in their platforms (Bनck et al. 2011) while studies of SDUWLHV·
preferences theorize that relative location of preferences on the most important 
dimensions of conflict matter (Laver and Shepsle 1996). This focus on ideological 
differences has spread widely (Tsebelis 2002; Bawn 1999; Thies 2001; Martin and 
Vanberg 2004, 2005, 2011; Kim and Loewenberg 2005; Indridason and Kam 2008; 
Lipsmeyer and Pierce 2011; Eichorst 2013). This literature identifies coalition 
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agreements, junior ministers or legislative committees, as tools used to oversee and 
constrain coalition partners·DFWLYLWLHVLQeach ministry. We argue that ideological 
differences between potential coalition parties influence negotiations for portfolio 
allocation as well. If a party expresses preferences distant from the proposed FRDOLWLRQ·V
negotiated position, coalition partners may be less willing to delegate responsibility for 
the corresponding portfolio to that party.2 Furthermore, ideologically central parties 
have greater coalition opportunities and therefore, greater intra-coalition bargaining 
potential (Laver and Shepsle 1996; Laver and Schofield 1998). 
Disagreement on the broadest dimension of conflict among coalition partners is 
likely to be an important factor as it structures legislative politics. For example, research 
in American politics has found mixed support for the argument that Congressional 
committees are made up of preference outliers; actors whose preferences are not 
representative of the legislature as a whole (c.f. Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Krehbiel 
1990; Groseclose 1994; Londregan and Snyder 1994). Research on parliamentary systems 
also finds mixed support for the argument that committees and ministers are preference 
outliers (Franchino and Rahming 2003; McElroy 2006; Indridason and Kam 2008; 
Indridason and Kristinsson 2013).   
This discussion is similar, but not identical to, /DYHUDQG6KHSVOH·V
description of very strong parties. They argue that parties with ideological positions on 
multiple dimensions of conflict located at the generalized median of the legislature have 
a decisive advantage for coalition participation; such a party must be included in any 
proposed coalition for that coalition to be successfully established (Laver and Shepsle 
9 
 
1996: 70). We extend that logic to the allocation of portfolios within a coalition, although 
ZHDGGWKDWSDUWLHV·SUHIHUHQFHVIRUVSHFLILFSRUWIROLRs depend on disagreements related 
to the exact issues connected to each portfolio. Broad ideological dimensions may be 
indicative of issue level preferences, but a focus on the largest dimensions likely masks 
more nuanced and dynamic preferences for individual portfolios. Our second 
hypothesis therefore SRVLWVWKDWZKHQDSDUW\·VSRVLWLRQGLYHUJHVIURPWKHZLWKLQ
coalition average position on some issue dimension, its chances of being assigned the 
corresponding ministerial portfolio decrease.     
 
H2:  The ideological distance between a party and the average coalition position 
will decrease the likelihood that corresponding portfolio will be assigned to that 
party. 
 
Following this perspective, we expect that ideological differences and issue 
salience will interact to influence portfolio allocation. Although ideological diversity 
may limit the parties that join a coalition and their bargaining power (Laver and 
Shepsle 1996), disagreement likely plays a different role in portfolio allocation. 
Assuming that cabinet ministers have strong agenda setting powers within policy 
jurisdictions (Laver and Shepsle 1996), ideologically distant parties place greater value 
on portfolios tied to salient issues. While ideologically central parties also seek out 
portfolios on issues prominent in their platforms or historically important to the party, 
their ability to form a coalition with broadly ideologically close parties inherently 
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depends on their willingness to compromise with more extreme parties. Ideologically 
distant parties likely see less reason to join coalitions and are less likely to trust their 
coalition partners. From this perspective, formateur parties are also unlikely to propose 
coalition arrangements that grant parties with distant preferences on an issue strong 
policy-making influence, particularly when the coalition partner holds the issue more 
salient.  
It has long been argued that parties join coalitions when the policy gains 
outweigh the electoral costs of participation in the coalition (Strøm 1984; Martin and 
Vanberg 2011). Additionally, Martin and Vanberg (2011) show that coalition parties 
subject their SDUWQHUV·SROLF\SURSRVDOVto greater scrutiny the more the partneUV·
preferences diverge. Falcó-Gimeno (2012) finds that ideological divergence within 
coalition governments increases their UHOLDQFHRQ´FRQWUROPHFKDQLVPVµWRHQIRUFH
cooperation between coalition partners. Conversely, ideologically central partners have 
a greater likelihood of being the formateur party and controlling the prime minister 
position and therefore may have less bargaining power for additional portfolio 
positions (Glasgow et al. 2011).  
When coalition partners· preferences converge, there is more likely to be trust 
between the partners. Conversely, preference divergence reduces trust . By making a 
disagreement salient, an issue that is very important to at least one coalition party likely 
exacerbates distrust. In effect, salience can exacerbate GLVDJUHHPHQW·VQHJDWLYHimpact 
on the likelihood of portfolio allocation. This logic leads us to the following hypothesis. 
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H3a) Ideological disagreement decreases the positive effect of issue salience on 
the likelihood that a particular portfolio will be assigned to a party. 
  
The formateur·VJRDOVKRZHYHUDUHDWRGGVZLWK the policy goals of the other 
potential coalition members. Faced with strong disagreement, policy motivated parties 
will be unwilling to join a coalition in which their salient policies are left to other 
parties. When a party holds an issue more salient than its partners and disagrees with 
the formateur, that party likely sees that portfolio as a key condition for their coalition 
participation. Consider a green party that holds the environmental portfolio more 
salient than other coalition parties and also places great salience on the environment 
itself. If its position on the environment also differs from the formateur·V, the green party 
would presumably only join the coalition if it were offered the environment portfolio.  
This context creates the opportunity for the portfolio equivalent of a legislative 
logroll (see de Marchi and Laver 2016 for a similar, formal theoretical approach). 
Because parties hold varying issues salient and disagree on a number of issues, parties 
DJUHHWRVXSSRUWHDFKRWKHU·Vrelatively extreme policies on the issues that each holds 
most important. From this perspective, parties demand policy on issues they care about 
more than other parties in the coalition and on which other coalition parties would take 
a dramatically different approach. Further, the party proposing the initial policy trade 
(or portfolio) is unlikely to care much that the bargaining party will take a more 
extreme position because the party does not hold the policy or portfolio as salient. 
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Indeed, coalition formation in Western Europe closely conforms to a legislative 
bargaining logic based on their control of legislative seats (Cutler et al. 2016). 
This logic leads us to predict that holding an issue salient, but not as strongly as 
another coalition party decreases the likelihood of controlling a portfolio. However, a 
party holding distinct preferences for an issue that also prioritizes the issue more than 
other coalition partners will be able to use logrolls (on issues it holds less important) to 
control the associated portfolio. The formateur may even offer portfolios on issues not 
salient to the formateur, but of substantial importance to a potential partner to avoid 
concessions on more important issues as a form of a portfolio logroll. In the face of 
greater disagreement, the party emphasizing the issue most is more likely to demand 
control of the portfolio as central to its policy demands for coalition participation. We 
summarize this logic in the final hypothesis. 
 
 
H3b) When a party holds a portfolio the most salient, ideological disagreement 
increases the positive effect of issue salience on the likelihood that a portfolio will 
be assigned to that party.   
 
We propose a theory of portfolio allocation in coalition formation that takes into 
account the relative salience of portfolios to parties as well as their ideological 
disagreements. We expect that issue salience increases the likelihood that a party 
receives a minister, particularly if they hold the issue more salient than their coalition 
13 
 
partners. Disagreement on these issues, however, decreases the likelihood that a party 
receives a portfolio by decreasing the effect of salience. Therefore, ideologically central 
parties with the high salience on an issue are the most likely to receive them unless 
another potential coalition party holds it more salient. In this context, the effect of 
disagreement reverses  as the parties engage in portfolio logrolls.  
Methods and Data 
There has been a great deal of research on the allocation of portfolios in coalition 
governments (Warwick and Druckman 2001, 2006; Mershon 2001; Druckman and 
Roberts 2005; Carroll and Cox 2007; Bनck et al. 2011). We build on this research 
following Bäck et al. (2011) in using party-portfolio pairings to test our hypotheses on 
the portfolios parties receive. Structuring our data this way allows us to examine 
relationships between individual parties systematically at the portfolio level. We 
examine disagreements on each issue between a party and its coalition partners while 
accounting for issue salience.   
To test our hypotheses, we combine data on portfolio allocation and party 
preferences. Like Bäck et al. (2011), our unit of analysis is the party-portfolio pair for 
each coalition government. We analyzHWKHHIIHFWVRILQGLYLGXDOSDUWLHV·FKDUDFWHULVWLFV
on portfolio allocation. By including an observation for each party on each portfolio in a 
government, we can directly link SDUWLHV·LVVXHOHYHOSUHIHUHQFHVand salience. Using 
data from Strøm and Müller (2000), our analysis includes party-portfolio pairings from 
thirteen Western European countries.34  
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We measure our dependent variable as a dummy variable equaling one if the 
party controls the portfolio using the 13 issues/policy jurisdictions identified by Back et 
al. (2011) using the CMP. This limits our analysis to 4363 observations in 169 cabinets. 
We lose additional observations because of the availability of party level data from the 
CMP for the measures of ideological disagreement and issue salience. The sample 
decreases further due to limited data on coalition agreements from Strøm et al. (2008).  
To measure our primary independent variables, ideological disagreement and 
issue salience, we use data from the CMP (Volkens et al. 2011). We construct a measure 
of issue salience by connecting each portfolio to the issues most closely related to the 
substantive jurisdiction of the cabinet position based on Bäck et al. (2011).5 We then 
create a dummy variable to test our first hypothesis equal to one if the party holds the 
issue more salient than any other coalition party.6 We create an interaction between 
these measures of issue salience and ideological disagreement to test our primary 
hypotheses. We present summary statistics in Table 1. 
***TABLE 1 HERE*** 
Although previous analyses include a dummy variable to measure whether the 
party was in the median position of the coalition, this measure underrepresents 
ideological disagreement in coalitions. We relax the assumption that the left-right 
ideological position best represents differences between parties on diverse issues. 
Instead, we construct a new portfolio specific measure of disagreement using the issue 
level codes in the CMP. We use this data to create logged measures of ideology for 
parties on individual issue scales.7 We use the same categories used to establish salience 
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for the issue (BೂFNHWDODQGXVH/RZHHWDO·VORJJHGWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ to 
create directional scales.8 Negative scores indicate leftward positions.9 We then find the 
SDUW\·VGLVWDQFHIURPWKHPHDQFRDOLWLRQSRVLWLRQRQHDFKLVVXHDVWKHDEVROXWH
difference between WKHPHDQSRVLWLRQDQGHDFKSDUW\·VSRVLWLRQ10  
To account for the traditional importance of a portfolio in a country we include the 
SRUWIROLR·VUDQNIURP:DUZLFNDQG'UXFNPDQ%HFDXVHWKHFRQGLWLRQDOORJLW
estimates require variation within each portfolio in a cabinet, we include only the 
LQWHUDFWLRQRIWKHSRUWIROLR·VUDQNZLWKWKHSHUFHQWDJHVHDWVD party controls.11 The 
conditional logit drops the constitutive terms from the model because of the perfect 
collinearity with the fixed effects. To account for the coalition bargaining conditions, we 
also include dummy variables if the coalition reached a comprehensive policy 
agreement from Strøm et al. (2008) and for minority coalitions using data from the 
ParlGov Database (Döring and Manow 2012). Following Bäck et al. (2011), we create 
interactions of these variables with issue salience because they do not vary within the 
coalition. We expect that issue salience is less important when there is a coalition 
agreement because policy goals are more explicitly determined before the start of the 
coalition. Likewise, salience should matter more in minority governments because the 
FRDOLWLRQUHOLHVRQHDFKSDUW\·VVHDWFRQWULEXWLRQPRUHWKDQXQGHUFRQGLWLRQVRIVXUSOXV
majority or minimum winning coalitions. We also include a dummy variable to indicate 
the median party in parliament (Laver and Shepsle 1996).12 We account for the 
formateur·V bargaining power using a dummy variable for the Prime Minister·V party. 
Additional models controlling for the relative salience of parties in the broader 
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parliament, the ideological range of the parliament, the number of coalition parties, 
previous experience controlling the portfolio ( Martin and Stevenson 2010) and 
parliamentary parties as well as alternate specifications of the issue disagreement lead 
to similar patterns of significance (see the Online Appendix). 
We test our hypotheses using a conditional logit model, allowing us to predict the 
likelihood that each party places a minister on a portfolio based on their issue 
disagreement and relative salience. The portfolio directed nature of the dependent 
variable means that the same portfolio in each government is in the sample multiple 
times, introducing a lack of independence between the observations. The conditional 
logit model accounts for these issues by treating each portfolio in a government as the 
discrete choice in a government formation opportunity and parties as the alternatives.  
 
Analysis 
 
We hypothesize a complex relationship between the absolute and relative 
importance of a portfolio to a party (and the coalition), the extent of disagreement 
between that party in a coalition and its likelihood of being assigned that portfolio. 
Table 2 presents the results from our analysis. Model 1 presents baseline, non-interacted 
results, whereas the following models present increasingly complex interactions with 
and without standard controls. The results provide suggestive evidence consistent with 
our theory. 
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In our first hypothesis (H1), we predict that relative issue salience increases the 
likelihood that a party controls a portfolio..  The effect of  issue salience depends on 
whether the party holds the issue more important than other coalition parties. The 
evidence for this hypothesis is mixed. In Model 1 (excluding the interaction of 
ideological disagreement), the coefficient for holding a portfolio most salient is in the 
correct direction, but not statistically significant. The effect becomes significant once it is 
interacted with ideological disagreement in the fully specified models, but is in the 
wrong direction. In the fully interacted models, the coefficients for the constitutive term 
and the three-way interactions are in the  expected directions, suggesting that holding 
an issue more salient than coalition partners boosts the likelihood that a party controls 
the minister, although the constitutive term is not significant in the model with controls. 
<<<FIGURE 1 HERE>>> 
The presence of complex interactions makes direct interpretation of coefficients 
difficult. Therefore, we present the effect of issue salience graphically in Figure 1 
holding the level of  disagreement at high and low levels (two standard deviations 
above and below the mean). Consistent with past research, salience increases the 
likelihood that a party controls a minister. The increase is quite strong at low levels of 
disagreement, however, the intercept for the party that holds the issue the most salient 
at low disagreement is higher than those that do not. At higher levels of disagreement, 
the effect of issue salience weakly increases the likelihood of controlling the minister for 
parties that hold the issue most salient, but the level of salience has no effect for parties 
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that do not hold the issue most salient. These results are weakly consistent with H1; 
they further indicate that ideological disagreement plays an important role.13 
Our second and third hypotheses consider the effect of issue level disagreement 
between cabinet members on portfolio allocation. In particular, we predict that 
increased distance from the mean coalition position will decrease the chance that a 
party will control that portfolio in a coalition (H2). We also hypothesize that the effect 
of ideological disagreement will moderate the effect of issue salience (H3a and H3b). 
The results in Table 1 are somewhat consistent with the hypotheses. In particular, the 
coefficients and the constitutive terms for disagreement are in the wrong direction, and 
statistically different from zero in the models, although the presence of multiple 
interactions limits the direct interpretability of the constitutive terms. However, the 
strong negative and statistically significant coefficients for salience and disagreement in 
the fuller models indicate that the effect of disagreement is conditional on issue salience. 
This evidence suggests that ideological disagreement on a specific issue decreases the 
likelihood that a party controls a portfolio in most contexts, but the positive and 
statistically significant coefficients for the three way interaction in Model 4 and Model 5 
indicate that the effects differ across parties that hold the portfolio salient and those that 
hold it the most salient.  
The complicated specification makes substantive interpretation of the coefficients 
difficult. To illustrate the moderating effect of ideological disagreement, Figure 2 
presents the predicted change likelihood associated with ideological disagreement for 
parties which hold an issue at high levels of salience.14 We plot the predicted likelihood 
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of holding the minister as the level of disagreement increases. This effect holds most 
clearly for coalition parties that hold an issue very salient, but for which another party 
holds it more important. Consistent with H3a, ideologically distant parties are less 
likely to gain portfolios that they dedicate substantial attention to in their platforms, but 
on which another party finds more salient. Presumably, coalition parties are unwilling  
to give distant coalition partners portfolios, particularly when another party finds the 
issue more salient (H3b). Furthermore, as predicted in H3b, the effect of holding an 
issue most salient seems to counter the negative effect of ideological disagreement at 
high levels of salience, as the likelihood of controlling the portfolio increases. 
Disagreement increases the likelihood of controlling a minister for the party holding the 
issue most salient at high levels of salience presumably because it is unwilling to join a 
coalition without controlling these portfolios and will engage in logrolls on portfolios 
most salient to other parties. This result is consistent with a story in which these parties 
have made their coalition participation conditional on controlling these portfolios. 
<<<FIGURE 2 HERE>>> 
Many of the control variables also meet our expectations. The percentage of seats 
a party contributes to the coalition is strongly significant in Model 5. Consistent with 
*DPVRQ·V/DZWKHSDUW\·VVHDWFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHFDELQHWpositively increases  the 
likelihood of controlling each portfolio. However, as Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason 
(2013) show, the relationship between seats and portfolios is hardly proportional. The 
positive coefficient for the interaction of portfolio rank and percentage seats is also 
positive, but does not reach statistical significance in Model 5. Expert portfolio rankings 
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may partially reflect shared issue preferences of parties that traditionally enter into 
government. In contrast to Bनck et al. (2011), the interactions of issue salience with 
comprehensive policy agreements and minority governments are positive, although 
only minority governments reach statistical significance. Finally, dummy variables for 
the SULPHPLQLVWHUV·SDUW\DQGWKHmedian party in the parliament are positive, but not 
statistically different from zero. This result may reflect support for our nuanced 
empirical measurement of the ideological relationships between parties. Overall, the 
models perform quite well, slightly increasing the percent correctly predicted by about 
.5% or 21 additional portfolio allocations between the simple and full models.  
 
Conclusion 
 Studies KDYHIRXQGLQFUHDVLQJHYLGHQFHWKDWSDUWLHV·FKDUDFWHUistics influence the 
likelihood that they control a portfolio. We add to that disagreement on issues between 
coalition partners and relative salience  conditionally influence portfolio allocation. We 
test hypotheses using new measures of portfolio level disagreement and an indicator for 
coalition parties holding an issue most salient. 
We find that portfolio allocation depends in part on an interaction between 
relative issue salience and issue level disagreements. The effect of issue salience and 
disagreement depends on the extent to which the party holds an issue more salient than 
any other coalition party. Parties likely demand portfolios they hold more important 
than others and hold more distant positions on, yet are willing to forego portfolios to 
distant partners when others hold them more salient. This adds to evidence that 
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coalition formation and portfolio allocation is driven by ideological differences between 
coalition partners (Laver and Shepsle 1996; Lipsmeyer and Pierce 2011), but adds that 
measures of broad disagreement alone tell only part of the story. Our use of issue based 
measures of disagreement further validates approaches that suggest parties hold 
distinct preferences on diverse issues and that this variance holds important 
implications for political outcomes.  
Our findings tell a fuller story of portfolio allocation. Bनck et al. (2011) predicted 
that the presence of formal coalition agreements should diminish the importance of 
issue salience. However, their analysis did not find a significant interaction (p. 458).  
Our findings demonstrate that ideological disagreement has different effects on the 
probability of a given portfolio being allocated to a particular party depending on the 
salience of the related issue area. Namely, salience matters most in relation to 
ideological disagreement. Müller and Strøm (2000) argue that coalition agreements are a 
function of ex ante policy uncertainties. There is considerable literature that such ex ante 
uncertainties are correlated with ideological disagreement (c.f. McCubbins and 
Schwartz 1984; McCubbins et al. 1987, 1989; Huber and Shipan 2002). In this context, 
our finding that ideological disagreement has a significant effect when an issue is 
extremely important to a party, but on which another party values it more suggests a 
possible explanation for findings of a statistically insignificant interaction effect 
between salience and coalition agreements.  
Furthermore, our analysis touches on research on preference outliers and 
ministerial drift. Much of the research on coalition government focusses on how 
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FRDOLWLRQSDUWQHUVFRQVWUDLQHDFKRWKHU·VPLQLVWHUV7KLHV0DUWLQDQG9DQEHUJ
2004, 2005, 2011; Kim and Loewenberg 2005; Indridason and Kam 2008; Lipsmeyer and 
Pierce 2011; Indridason and Kristinsson 2013). This research views ministers as 
preference outliers in coalitions. Our findings further underscore the importance of 
issue salience in coalition behavior and suggest an additional reason that parties with 
extreme long term salience might receive the same ministers across coalitions over time 
(e.g. Martin and Stevenson 2010). Ministers tend only be preference outliers when 
parties care about a set of issues more than others. These findings indicate the need for 
additional research into the motivations for employing mechanisms for constraining 
coalition partners such as watchdog junior ministers, strong committees and 
amendments to proposed legislation from the floor of the parliament.   
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean 
Standard  
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum N 
% Issue Salience .105 0.072 .0013 .296 4279 
Most Salient .317 0.465 0 1 4279 
Disagreement .03 0.032 0 .329 4279 
% Cabinet Seats .339 0.248 .0156 .972 4279 
Comprehensive 
Agreement 
.391 0.488 0 1 4279 
Minority Coalition .156 0.363 0 1 4279 
Median Party .118 0.323 0 1 4279 
PM Party .331 0.471 0 1 4279 
Portfolio Weight 1.14 0.288 .5 2.01 4279 
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Table 2. Conditional Logit Estimates of Portfolio Allocation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Simple Salience Disagreement Full Controls 
      
% Issue Salience 1.988* 3.542** 3.459** 5.900*** 4.820** 
(0.935) (1.122) (1.187) (1.491) (1.668) 
Most Salient 0.023 0.256* 0.006 0.348* 0.195 
 (0.073) (0.113) (0.074) (0.157) (0.180) 
Disagreement 1.324*** 1.337*** 2.369*** 3.091*** 3.299*** 
 (0.377) (0.376) (0.623) (0.760) (0.768) 
Most Salient X 
% Issue Salience 
 -2.371**  -4.122** -2.290 
 (0.897)  (1.278) (1.448) 
% Issue Salience 
X Disagreement 
  -7.511* -16.065** -17.981** 
  (3.512) (5.416) (5.740) 
Most Salient X 
Disagreement 
   -0.934 -1.090 
   (0.816) (0.880) 
Most Salient X 
% Issue Salience 
X Disagreement 
   13.213* 12.770+ 
   (6.349) (6.767) 
% Cabinet Seats     2.190*** 
     (0.551) 
% Cabinet Seats 
X Portfolio 
Importance 
    -0.031 
    (0.449) 
Comprehensive 
Agreement X 
Salience 
    0.411 
    (1.572) 
Minority 
Coalition X 
Salience 
    6.960*** 
    (1.987) 
Median Party     0.036 
     (0.094) 
PM Party     0.065 
     (0.072) 
ȋ 27.212 35.146 31.112 40.980 355.003 
Log-Likelihood -1485.201 -1481.474 -1482.869 -1476.119 -1302.598 
AIC 2976.402 2970.948 2973.739 2966.238 2631.196 
Percentage 
Correctly 
Predicted 
65.786 66.324 65.903 66.324 71.979 
Observations 4279 4279 4279 4279 4279 
 
 
 
Conditional Logit estimates are clustered on the government id. Standard Errors are in 
parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001. The results for each model excludes issue salience outliers in the 95% (over 29% 
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of the platform). Analysis including the outliers including a dummy variable to control 
for them leads to similar coefficients for the key coefficients, although the joint effects 
are no longer significant.  
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Figure 1. Predicted Effect of Relative Issue Salience at Low and High Disagreement15 
 
 
Figure 2.  Predicted Effect of Disagreement on Portfolio Allocation16  
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2QOLQH$SSHQGL[WR´5XOLQJ'LYLGHG Disagreement, Issue Salience and Portfolio 
$OORFDWLRQµ 
 
In this Online Appendix, we present a number of supplementary materials for 
the main manuscript. In particular, we outline much greater detail the 
operationalization of key independent variables. We also present the results of a 
number of robustness checks. These checks include an alternate measure of relative 
salience, multiple analyses meant to evaluate the sensitivity of the models to problems 
identified in the Comparative Manifestos Project, and a model that includes range of 
alternate controls.  
 
Measurement 
 
In the main analysis we use three measures derived from the CMP: issue 
salience, relative salience and issue preferences. These measures are based on the 
coding scheme proposed by Bäck et al. (2011).1 In their analysis, they propose a 
                                                          
1 As described in the data and methods section, we also add data from France. In particular, our analysis 
includes the Ministre des Affaires étrangères (Foreign Affairs), Ministre de l'intérieur (Interior), Ministre de la 
justice (Justice), Ministre des finances (Finance), Ministre de la defense (Defense), Ministre du travail (Labour), 
Ministre dH/·pGXFDWLRQQDWLRQDOH (Education), Ministre de la santé (Health), Ministre de l'agriculture 
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¶PD[LPDOLVW·scheme for measuring issue priorities linked to the policy jurisdictions of 
13 portfolios common in parliamentary democracies. For the exact list of the portfolios 
used in each country or the fuller logic behind the classifications, see Bäck et al. (2011). 
Table A1 presents the codes used to create the measures of salience for each 
portfolio. After reviewing their exact coding scheme we found little reason to disagree 
with their exact issue coding. Following Bäck et al (2011), we summarized each of the 
categories, regardless of direction, to create our measure of issue salience. For example, 
equation 1 illustrates the process for the Defence portfolio below. We then found the 
sum of the positive and negative issue categories, i, (105 and 104 for defence) for each 
party, pRQHDFKSRUWIROLRMXULVGLFWLRQIURPWKHSDUW\·VPDQLIHVWRLQWKHPRVWUHFHQW
preceding election as our primary independent variable. Since the issue classifications 
from the CMP are the percentage of manifesto statements on that category, the salience 
PHDVXUHVUHSUHVHQWWKHSHUFHQWDJHRIVWDWHPHQWVUHODWHGWRWKHSRUWIROLR·VMXULVGLFWLRQ 
 
Equation 1. Issue or Portfolio Salience 
  ܲ݋ݎ݂݋݈݅݋ݏ݈ܽ݅݁݊ܿ݁௣ ൌ ෍ ݅௣ ൅ ݅௣ 
 
(1) 
 ܦ݂݁݁݊ܿ݁݌݋ݎ݂݋݈݅݋ݏ݈ܽ݅݁݊ܿ݁௣ ൌ ෍ ݌݁ݎ ? ? ?௣ ൅ ݌݁ݎ ? ? ?௣ 
 
(2) 
 
  
We construct our second independent variable as a special case of issue salience. 
We measure a dummy variable equal to one if the party holds the issue more salient 
than any other party in the coalition. In particular, we find the maximum value on each 
portfolio jurisdiction, j, in a coalition. The party or parties that has this value in the 
coalition is allocated a 1 for our Most Salient variable on portfolio, j. If no party finds an 
issue salient the variable is equal to zero (and is dropped from the analysis based on the 
fixed effects used in the conditional logit. 
 Finally, we construct a measure of issue disagreement at the portfolio level. 
Using the same categories as those used to construct the measure of salience, we then 
find the positive (conservative or right) and negative (liberal or left) categories based on 
WKH&03FRGLQJVFKHPH8VLQJ/RZHHWDO·VWUDQVIRUPDWLRQZHFRQVWUXFWLVVXH
OHYHOVFDOHVEDVHGRQWKHSRUWIROLRV·MXULVGLFWLRQV7RFUHDWHWKHPHDVXUHZHILQGWKH
difference in the logged percentage of statements on right categories, +, and left 
categories, L. Equation 2 illustrates the process below. 
                                                          
(Agriculture), Ministre de l'industrie (Industry), Ministre de l'environnement (Environment), and the 
Ministre des affaires sociales (Social Affairs).  We recode WKHGDWDIRU)UDQFHE\FKHFNLQJWKH0LQLVWHU·VSDUW\
affiliation from the websites affiliated with each Ministry.   For example, we checked and recoded the 
party affiliation for the Interior ministry (Ministre de l'intérieurE\OLQNLQJWKHPLQLVWHU·VQDPH from the 
ZHEVLWHIRUWKH,QWHULRUZLWKWKHSHUVRQ·VDIILOLDWLRQOLVWHGDWWKHWLPHIURPWKHRQOLQHDUFKLYHVRIWKH
Assemblée Nationale and Senat. 
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Equation 2. Issue or Portfolio Disagreement. 
 ݌݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋݌݋ݏ݅ݐ݅݋݊௝ǡ௣ ൌ ൫ ௝ܴǡ௣ ൅ ܥ௣൯ െ ሺܮ௝ǡ௣ ൅ ܥ௣ሻ 
 
(3) 
 ܥ ൌ  ? ? ?Ǥ  ?ܰ 
 
(4) 
 ݌݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋݌݋ݏ݅ݐ݅݋݊ௗ௘௙௘௡௖ǡ௣ൌ ൫݌݁ݎ ? ? ?ௗ௘௙௘௡௖௘ǡ௣ ൅ ܥ௣൯ െ ሺ݌݁ݎ ? ? ?ௗ௘௙௘௡௖௘ǡ௣ ൅ ܥ௣ሻ 
 
(5) 
 
:HXSGDWHG/RZHHWDO·VVFDOHVEDVHGRQWKHLURQOLQHPDWHULDOVXVLQJWKHLU
updated means for transferring percentages to their logged scale.2 The main difference 
is in how C, the offset, is calculated given the usage of percentages rather than raw 
counts of statements. Following their online materials we calculated C as the fraction of 
0.5 and the total number of statements in the manifesto, N, multiplied by 100. As with 
salience, we use the defence portfolio to illustrate the process. The exact codes linked to 
the left and right for each portfolio are presented in Table A1. To convert this to a 
measure of disagreement, we then find the mean position of disagreement across 
coalition parties and find the absolute value of the difference from the party and mean 
position. In robustness checks below, we show that the exact choice of measurement for 
disagreement has few consequences for our substantive analysis.  
 
Robustness Checks and Sensitivity Analyses 
 
 We include a number of robustness checks to insure that our results are not 
spurious or driven by our measurement choices. In particular, we focus our sensitivity 
analyses on the measurement of the key independent variable, relative salience, the 
measurement of disagreement from the CMP (logged versus non-logged RILE and 
accounting for the Standard Errors ² Benoit et al. 2009), and we offer a model that 
accounts for a number of additional controls.  
 
Relative Salience ² Ratio versus dummy 
In the main analysis we measure relative salience using a dummy variable for the 
party that holds an issue more salient in their platforms than any other cabinet party. 
The measurement follows the logic that there is something special about holding an 
issuHPRVWLPSRUWDQW$QDOWHUQDWHPHDVXUHWKDWFDSWXUHVPRUHLQIRUPDWLRQSDUWLHV·
relative salience, yet introduces substantially more multicollinearity would produce a 
ratio of how much less salient other coalition parties hold a portfolio. We construct this 
                                                          
2 See the discussion in the Appendix at the following link (Accessed September 19, 2016): 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/17073&studyListingIndex=0_5770dea2e7a7
c2ac7d8938933f90  
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PHDVXUHE\GLYLGLQJHDFKSDUW\·VVDOLHQFHVFRUHE\WKHYDOXHRIVDOLHQFHWKDWWKHSDUW\
with the highest salience in that coalition. The value therefore equals 1 for the party 
with the highest value and decreases to zero for those that do not discuss the portfolio.  
 We present these results in Table A2. Although not all coefficients are significant 
the substantive interpretation of the coefficients is largely similar to that in the main 
analysis. The full set of interactions are jointly significant at the 90% level from zero 
based on a Wald test. Consistent with the first hypothesis, the constitutive term for 
issues salience is clearly positive and significant. Yet, the interaction of salience with the 
relative ratio is negative, and the three way interaction is positive.  The combined effect 
of issue salience and the ratio of salience do not quite reach statistically different effects 
from issue salience alone with p-values at the 84% level.  However the moderating 
effect of issue disagreement remains significant at the 95% level in joint tests of the 
FRHIILFLHQWV·VLJQLILFDQFH%URDGO\DOWKRXJKWKHDOWHUQDWHRSHUDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRIUHODWLYH
salience increases the multicollinearity in the model and leads to a small increase in the 
standard errors, the substantive interpretation of the results is similar to that presented 
in the main analysis. 
 
Measuring Ideological Disagreement ²RAW CMP scores  
 
 In our main analysis we use a logged version of the CMP RILE scale based on 
/RZHHWDO·VDSSURDFK,Q7DEOe A3 and Table A4, we present results with two 
alternate operationalizations to show they are not sensitive to the approach. In 
particular, we present models similar to those in the main analysis in Table A3, but use 
the raw categories form the CMP. Rather than logging the issue categories and finding 
the difference, we instead find the simple difference in left-right categories to create the 
issue level positions. The coefficients and patterns of significance are extremely similar 
to those presented in the main analysis. Importantly, a joint test of the of the interaction 
components is significant at the 95% level.  
 
Measuring Ideological Disagreement ²CMP scores with varying error 
Given that the simulation commands (SIMEX) proposed by Benoit et al. (2009) 
are not compatible with a conditional logit analysis, Bäck et al. (2011) proposed an 
analysis at upper and lower bounds of the CMP. We take a similar approach adding or 
subtracting one standard deviation of each issue category based on the observed 
´VWDQGDUGHUURUµRIHDFKFRGHIURP%HQRLWHWDO:HWKHQUXQWKLVDQDO\VLVZLWK
the lower and upper bounds in Table A4.  Intriguingly, varying the results at the upper 
bound leads to strong significant results for each of the components, like the primary 
analysis, but the lower bound leads many variables to drop just below significance. This 
likely occurs as a reduction by the standard error marks a difficult test; it systematically 
reduces values to zero (we replace any value as zero that would be less than zero) that 
would otherwise be positive. The main result for issue salience and disagreement holds 
and remains strong in both models. Disagreement moderates the effect of issue salience, 
although the effect of holding the issue most salient disappears. 
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Measuring Ideological Disagreement ² overview 
 
 Each of the sensitivity analyses for measurement suggests strong evidence for the 
effect of issue salience and disagreement. However, evidence for holding the issue most 
salient is less consistent. Future analysis should consider in greater detail the nuances of 
issue salience and disagreement in this context. 
 
Additional Controls 
In Table A5 and Table A6 we include varying control variables related to the 
EURDGHUSDUOLDPHQW·VFKDUDFWHULVWLFV,QSDUWLFXODUZHLQFOXGHPHDVXUHVRIWKHHIIHFWLYH
number of cabinet parties, effective number of parliamentary parties, the parliamentary 
ideological range for each portfolio, the mean parliamentary position for each portfolio, 
the mean parliamentary salience for each portfolio and the maximum parliamentary 
salience for each portfolio. The results are not only robust to the inclusion of these 
variables, but also the level of significance for joint tests of the interactions remains 
significant at the 95% level in both cases.   
 
Previously controlling the Minister  
 %DVHGRQ0DUWLQDQG6WHYHQVRQ·VZRUNWKHUHLVVRPHSRWHQWLDOWKDW
controlling a minister in the past increases the likelihood that they will control it in the 
future. To account for this, we create a count variable equal to the number of times the 
party has controlled the portfolio in previous coalitions within the sample.  As they 
might predict, the variable is positive and strongly significant. However, the variable 
has little effect on the results of the primary variables. The full interaction is statistically 
significant at the 90% level and the effect of issue level disagreement for parties that 
hold the issue most salient is different than the effect for issue level disagreement for 
other parties.  
 
Listwise presentation of results with full controls 
 In Table A8, we include the same models as those presented in the main analysis, 
but including the full set of controls used in Model 5 of the main analysis. The results 
closely mirror those of the primary analysis. Given the similar baseline for comparison 
from the controls, we can show more realistically the difference between model 
performance based on Table A8. Therefore, we include the percent correctly predicted 
for each model in Figure A1. Similar to the improvement shown by the main models, 
the overall performance increases by nearly 0.5 percent once the full interaction is 
included. This is a somewhat small increase, but not inconsequential as this helps place 
approximately 21 additional ministers over those predicted by the Bäck et al. (2011) 
models. 
 
Conclusions 
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This Online Appendix has outlined the exact measurement strategy and a large 
number of robustness checks. Although the exact levels of significance for the full 
interaction vary across models, the trend occurs repeatedly, regardless of the model 
specification. These results lead us to conclude that the data largely support the 
hypotheses.  
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Table A1. 
Portfolio Jurisdiction Left Issue Categories Right Issue Categories 
Foreign   
 
101: Foreign Special Relationships: 
Positive 
103: Anti-imperialism 
106: Peace + 107: Internationalism: 
Positive 
108: European Community: Positive 
102: Foreign Special Relationships: 
Negative  
109: Internationalism: Negative  
110: European Community: Negative 
Defence 105: Military: Negative 104: Military: Positive 
Interior 201: Freedom and Human Rights 
202: Democracy 
203: Constitutionalism: Positive 
301: Decentralisation 
607: Multiculturalism: Positive 
204: Constitutionalism: Negative 
302: Centralisation 
303: Governmental and 
Administrative Efficiency 
304: Political Corruption 
605: Law and Order 
608: Multiculturalism: Negative 
Justice 201: Freedom and Human Rights 
202: Democracy 
203: Constitutionalism: Positive 
204: Constitutionalism: Negative 
303: Governmental and 
Administrative Efficiency  
304: Political Corruption 
605: Law and Order 
Finance 402: Incentives 414: Economic Orthodoxy   
Economy 
³(FRQRPLF
*RDOV´XVHGLQ
salience measure, 
but not position) 
 
403: Market Regulation 
404: Economic Planning 
405: Corporatism 
406: Protectionism: Positive 
412: Controlled Economy 
413: Nationalisation  
415: Marxist Analysis 
401: Free Enterprise 
407: Protectionism: Negative 
409: Keynesian Demand 
Management 
410: Productivity 
 
Labour 504: Welfare State Expansion 
701: Labour Groups: Positive 
505: Welfare State Limitation 
702: Labour Groups: Negative 
Education 506: Education Expansion 507: Education Limitation 
Health 504: Welfare State Expansion 
706: Non-economic Demographic 
Groups 
505: Welfare State Limitation 
 
Agriculture 501: Environmental Protection 703: Agriculture and Farmers 
Industry 
³(FRQRPLF
*RDOV´XVHGLQ
salience measure, 
but not position) 
 
 
402: Incentives 
403: Market Regulation 
404: Economic Planning 
405: Corporatism 
406: Protectionism: Positive 
412: Controlled Economy 
413: Nationalisation 
401: Free Enterprise 
407: Protectionism: Negative 
409: Keynesian Demand 
Management 
410: Productivity 
414: Economic Orthodoxy 
Environment 501: Environmental Protection416: 
Anti-growth Economy 
 
410: Productivity 
 
Social Affairs 503: Social Justice 
604: Traditional Morality: Negative 
606: Social Harmony 
603: Traditional Morality: Positive 
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705: Underprivileged Minority 
Groups 
706: Non-economic Demographic 
Groups 
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Table A2. Salience Ratio3 
 (1) 
 Salience Ratio 
Min  
% Issue Salience 12.237** 
 (3.919) 
Salience Ratio -0.088 
 (0.338) 
Disagreement 2.868** 
 (1.095) 
% Issue Salience X 
Disagreement 
-25.360* 
 (12.332) 
Salience Ratio X % 
Issue Salience 
-7.081* 
 (3.419) 
Salience Ratio X 
Disagreement 
0.440 
 (1.290) 
Salience Ratio X % 
Issue Salience X 
Disagreement 
13.909 
 (13.521) 
% Cabinet Seats 2.371*** 
 (0.564) 
% Cabinet Seats X 
Portfolio Importance 
-0.105 
 (0.456) 
Comprehensive 
Agreement X Salience 
0.608 
 (1.649) 
Minority Coalition X 
Salience 
7.115*** 
 (2.120) 
Median Party 0.064 
 (0.095) 
PM Party -0.005 
 (0.070) 
ȋ 378.985 
Log-Likelihood -1249.991 
AIC 2525.983 
Observations 4116 
 
                                                          
3 Instead of a dummy variable for holding the issue most salient, the variable is a ratio of the salience to the party, 
relative to the party that holds it most salient in the coalition. Therefore, the value equal 1 for the party that holds 
it most salient. 
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Table A3. Positions from raw CMP scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Simple Ideology Salience Full 
Min     
% Issue Salience 2.147* 1.375 3.485* 3.215+ 
 (0.941) (1.407) (1.574) (1.808) 
Most Salient 0.044 0.062 0.470** 0.371* 
 (0.073) (0.081) (0.149) (0.171) 
Disagreement 0.043 -1.891 0.444 5.423+ 
 (1.498) (3.108) (3.220) (3.252) 
% Issue Salience X 
Disagreement 
 11.715 -10.417 -31.751 
  (15.764) (17.600) (19.473) 
Most Salient X % Issue 
Salience 
  -4.412*** -3.289* 
   (1.178) (1.303) 
Most Salient X 
Disagreement 
  -5.450 -10.025* 
   (4.340) (4.709) 
Most Salient X % Issue 
Salience X 
Disagreement 
  53.687* 77.129** 
   (22.901) (25.304) 
% Cabinet Seats    2.267*** 
    (0.556) 
% Cabinet Seats X 
Portfolio Importance 
   -0.088 
    (0.449) 
Comprehensive 
Agreement X Salience 
   0.297 
    (1.538) 
Minority Coalition X 
Salience 
   7.164*** 
    (1.996) 
Median Party    0.029 
    (0.094) 
PM Party    0.079 
    (0.074) 
ȋ 12.901 13.036 24.709 323.552 
Log-Likelihood -1493.377 -1493.088 -1486.213 -1309.888 
AIC 2992.754 2994.177 2986.426 2645.775 
Observations 4279 4279 4279 4279 
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Table A4. Positions with positions +/- Standard Deviation of CMP codes from Benoit, 
Laver and Mikhaylov (2009)  
 (1) (2) 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Min   
% Issue Salience 4.594** 5.113** 
 (1.651) (1.606) 
Most Salient 0.073 0.253 
 (0.184) (0.185) 
Disagreement 3.215*** 3.384*** 
 (0.766) (0.761) 
% Issue Salience X 
Disagreement 
-17.547** -18.593*** 
 (5.703) (5.594) 
Most Salient X % Issue 
Salience 
-1.519 -2.857+ 
 (1.472) (1.476) 
Most Salient X 
Disagreement 
-0.678 -1.422 
 (0.893) (0.912) 
Most Salient X % Issue 
Salience X 
Disagreement 
10.522 15.023* 
 (6.797) (6.933) 
% Cabinet Seats 2.167*** 2.178*** 
 (0.552) (0.553) 
% Cabinet Seats X 
Portfolio Importance 
-0.021 -0.033 
 (0.450) (0.450) 
Comprehensive 
Agreement X Salience 
0.469 0.349 
 (1.569) (1.566) 
Minority Coalition X 
Salience 
7.021*** 6.908*** 
 (1.996) (1.988) 
Median Party -0.025 -0.028 
 (0.093) (0.093) 
PM Party 0.075 0.067 
 (0.072) (0.070) 
ȋ 353.545 350.365 
Log-Likelihood -1303.575 -1302.279 
AIC 2633.151 2630.557 
Observations 4281 4280 
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Table A5. Controls for number of parliamentary and cabinet parties. 
 (1) 
 Simple 
Min  
% Issue Salience 4.608** 
 (1.633) 
Most Salient 0.234 
 (0.170) 
Disagreement 3.506*** 
 (0.800) 
% Issue Salience X 
Disagreement 
-19.160** 
(6.008) 
Most Salient X % Issue 
Salience 
-2.420+ 
(1.358) 
Most Salient X 
Disagreement 
-1.234 
(0.899) 
Most Salient X % Issue 
Salience X 
Disagreement 
13.517* 
(6.873) 
% Cabinet Seats -0.887 
 (0.640) 
% Cabinet Seats X 
Portfolio Importance 
0.312 
(0.399) 
Comprehensive 
Agreement X Salience 
0.697 
(1.614) 
Minority Coalition X 
Salience 
7.088*** 
(2.107) 
Median Party 0.055 
 (0.084) 
PM Party -0.002 
 (0.076) 
ENPP X % Cab Seats 0.290+ 
(0.149) 
EN Cab Parties X % 
Cab Seats 
0.721*** 
(0.207) 
Parliamentary Issue 
Range X % Cab Seats 
0.746* 
(0.335) 
ȋ 584.123 
Log-Likelihood -1285.414 
AIC 2602.828 
Observations 4281 
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Table A6. Controls for wider parliamentary preferences and Salience 
 (1) 
 Simple 
Min  
% Issue Salience 3.119+ 
 (1.780) 
Most Salient 0.386* 
 (0.169) 
Disagreement 6.497* 
 (3.299) 
% Issue Salience X 
Disagreement 
-35.545+ 
(20.121) 
Most Salient X % Issue 
Salience 
-3.502** 
(1.274) 
Most Salient X 
Disagreement 
-9.986* 
(4.712) 
Most Salient X % Issue 
Salience X Disagreement 
79.390** 
(25.474) 
% Cabinet Seats -0.562 
 (0.670) 
% Cabinet Seats X 
Portfolio Importance 
0.172 
(0.408) 
Comprehensive Agreement 
X Salience 
0.704 
(1.573) 
Minority Coalition X 
Salience 
7.041*** 
(2.033) 
Median Party 0.076 
 (0.084) 
PM Party 0.024 
 (0.080) 
ENPP X % Cab Seats 0.402** 
(0.148) 
EN Cab Parties X % Cab 
Seats 
0.668** 
(0.219) 
Mean Parliamentary Issue 
Position 
-3.385*** 
(0.528) 
Parliamentary Issue Range 71.637*** 
 (6.223) 
Average Parliamentary 
Salience 
159.819*** 
(20.503) 
Maximum Parliamentary 
Salience 
-150.466*** 
(14.621) 
ȋ . 
Log-Likelihood -1291.266 
AIC 2614.532 
Observations 4279 
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Table A7. Number of times previously controlling the portfolio 
 (1) 
 Previous 
Experience 
Min  
% Issue Salience 4.362* 
 (1.824) 
Most Salient 0.268 
 (0.180) 
Disagreement 6.640* 
 (3.215) 
% Issue Salience X 
Disagreement 
-37.813+ 
 (19.542) 
Most Salient X % Issue 
Salience 
-3.450** 
 (1.298) 
Most Salient X 
Disagreement 
-7.768 
 (5.582) 
Most Salient X % Issue 
Salience X 
Disagreement 
71.259* 
 (27.842) 
% Cabinet Seats 1.657** 
 (0.562) 
% Cabinet Seats X 
Portfolio Importance 
-0.184 
 (0.425) 
Comprehensive 
Agreement X Salience 
-0.003 
 (1.619) 
Minority Coalition X 
Salience 
6.096** 
 (2.026) 
Median Party -0.096 
 (0.104) 
PM Party 0.025 
 (0.086) 
Minister in past 0.160*** 
 (0.021) 
ȋ 352.704 
Log-Likelihood -1233.771 
AIC 2495.542 
Observations 4279 
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Table A8. Basic Models with full Controls. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Simple Salience Ideology Full 
Minister     
% Issue Salience 1.720 2.171 3.472* 4.820** 
 (1.205) (1.367) (1.403) (1.668) 
Most Salient 0.032 0.100 0.008 0.195 
 (0.081) (0.130) (0.083) (0.180) 
Disagreement 1.198*** 1.201*** 2.557*** 3.299*** 
 (0.325) (0.324) (0.625) (0.768) 
Most Salient X % 
Issue Salience 
 -0.695  -2.290 
  (1.009)  (1.448) 
% Issue Salience 
X Disagreement 
  -9.817* -17.981** 
   (3.874) (5.740) 
Most Salient X 
Disagreement 
   -1.090 
    (0.880) 
Most Salient X % 
Issue Salience X 
Disagreement 
   12.770+ 
    (6.767) 
% Cabinet Seats 2.218*** 2.206*** 2.207*** 2.190*** 
 (0.548) (0.547) (0.550) (0.551) 
% Cabinet Seats X 
Portfolio 
Importance 
-0.042 -0.041 -0.028 -0.031 
 (0.441) (0.442) (0.447) (0.449) 
Comprehensive 
Agreement X 
Salience 
-0.062 -0.029 0.586 0.411 
 (1.528) (1.529) (1.584) (1.572) 
Minority 
Coalition X 
Salience 
7.051*** 7.025*** 6.959*** 6.960*** 
 (1.986) (2.000) (2.015) (1.987) 
Median Party 0.054 0.050 0.043 0.036 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
PM Party 0.060 0.060 0.059 0.065 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
ȋ 353.106 354.087 355.698 355.003 
Log-Likelihood -1308.603 -1308.338 -1305.211 -1302.598 
AIC 2635.206 2636.675 2630.421 2631.196 
Percentage 
Correctly 
Predicted 
71.582 71.489 71.792 71.979 
Observations 4279 4279 4279 4279 
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Figure A1. Percent Correctly Predicted. 4 
 
  
                                                          
4 The percent correctly predicted are based on the results in Table 2 in the primary analysis.  Basic controls are 
added for each level to allow for more comparable predictions across models.  
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1 Like Bनck et al. (2011), we assume that the number and policy jurisdictions of portfolios remain stable 
within a country. While this assumption is not always supported empirically, this is unlikely to be 
problematic for our analysis, as we focus on a limited number of portfolios that tend to be more 
established in the countries under study. 
2 Considerable research examines the similarity of preferences and the willingness of principals to 
GHOHJDWHWRDJHQWV(SVWHLQDQG2·+DOORUDQ+XEHU et al. 2001; Huber and Shipan 2002). Principals 
support less delegation when their preferences differ from those of the intended agents.  In the case of 
portfolio allocation within coalition governments, a minister is the agent of the coalition as a whole. 
3 We pool data from coalition governments in Austria (1949-1998), Belgium (1961-1998), Denmark (1953-
1998), Finland (1945-1995), France (1959-1997), Germany (1953-1998), Ireland (1948-1998), Italy (1946-
1998), Luxembourg (1945-1994), the Netherlands (1946-1998), Norway (1961-1998), Portugal (1978-1985), 
and Sweden (1951-1994). Like Bनck et al. (2011), we used online government archives to recode any 
portfolio for which more than one minister listed.   
4 Bनck et al. (2011) exclude France from the analysis because of difficulty recoding the data. We include 
data from France by linking the portfolios most closely associated with the 13 types under analysis, 
excluding the Economy category because the French cabinets combine this ministry with the Finance 
portfolio. See the Online Appendix for additional details.   
5 For additional information see Bäck et al. (2011), Dumont (1998) or the Online Appendix. Using this 
¶PD[LPDOLVW·DSSURDFKWKHGDWDLQFOXGHVVRPHREVHUYDWLRQVZLWKH[WUHPHO\KLJKOHYHOVRIVDOLHQFHIRU
some issues relative to the rest of the sample. To account for the potential that these extreme values drive 
our results we exclude all observations over the 95% in the reported results. The primary independent 
variables drop slightly below standard levels of significance when these extreme values are included, 
although the negative effect for issue level disagreement remains weakly significant at the 90% level.   
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6 We also use the ratio of the relationship between issue salience and the coalition party with the highest 
salience and find that the coefficients are largely in the predicted direction, but the effect of this relative 
salience does not reach standard levels of significance. The primary effect seems to derive from this 
qualitative difference of holding the issue most salient and not how much more salient. 
7 See the Online Appendix (Table A1) for the exact coding of our issue scales. 
8 For additional information on the issue categories or the issue positions, see the Online Appendix. In the 
main analysis, we use logged measures of issue position, but robustness checks in the Appendix using 
the raw CMP scales lead to substantively similar results.  
9  :HVXEWUDFWWKHGLUHFWLRQDOOHIWFRGHVIURPULJKWFRGHVXVLQJWKH&03·VVXEMHFWLYHSRVLWLRQLQJ)RUWKH
Agricultural poUWIROLRZHVXEWUDFWFRGH´(QYLURQPHQWDO3URWHFWLRQµIURPFRGH´$JULFXOWXUHDQG
)DUPHUVµEHFDXVHWKHRULJLQDOVDOLHQFHPHDVXUHRQO\LQFOXGHGDVLQJOHFDWHJRU\ 
10 A common alternative is to construct the weighted mean by accounting for the relative size of the 
coalition partners. We choose our approach for two reasons. First, taking the weighted mean prevents us 
from distinguishing between the influence size (a ODJDPVRQ·VODZDQGLGHRORJLFDOSRVLWLRQKDYHRQ
FRDOLWLRQV·DVVLJQPHQWRISDrticular portfolios to particular parties. Second, our implied mechanism for 
FRDOLWLRQSDUWQHUV·QHJRWLDWLQJOHYHUDJHLVWKHWKUHDWRIH[LWIURPWKHFRDOLWLRQ negotiations. Laver and 
Shepsle (1996) and Tsebelis (1999; 2002) argue that pivotal position relative to other strategic actors is a 
more important factor driving negotiating advantage than size. More broadly, including seat share as an 
independent variable and as a weighting mechanism likely introduces unnecessary multicollinearity into 
the analysis and limits direct interpretation of the results. Robustness checks using the coalition median 
position reveal substantively similar results, although they do not reach standard levels of statistical 
significance. 
11 While this approach violates Brambor et aO·VGLUHFWLYHWRLQFOXGHFRQVWLWXWLYHWHUPVLQ
interactions, the use of the conditional logit makes compliance with this rule impossible. As the most 
appropriate choice in current models of portfolio allocation, our current model and controls mirror those 
used by Back et al. (2011).  
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12 An alternate operationalization that includes the mean parliament position to construct the measure of 
disagreement leads to substantively similar results.   
13 A Chi-Squared test of the coefficients indicates that the effect of holding the portfolio salient and most 
salient is jointly significant and different from salience alone at the 90% level in both Model 4 and Model 
5. 
14 Chi-Squared tests of the coefficients for the interaction of ideological disagreement and salience 
indicate that it is jointly significant at the 90% level in Model 3 and different from disagreement than 
disagreement alone at the 99.9% level. Consistent with the hypotheses, these coefficients are jointly 
significant at the 95% level in Model 4. The difference in the effect for the most salient interaction with 
disagreement and salience differs from disagreement at the 95% level in Model 4 and Model 5. The joint 
effect off holding the issues most salient is statistically different from zero at the 90% level the full 
models.   
15 The graph plots the change in the likelihood of a Minister from Issue Salience when there is low and 
high disagreement (2 standard deviations below and above mean disagreement) between the coalition 
party and the minister for the party with the highest salience and another party that finds the issue 
salient. 90% confidence intervals are simulated from 1000 draws of the variance-covariance matrix.  
Predictions are from the Conditional Logit estimates in Model 4.  Predictions are smoothed using Lowess.  
16 The graph plots the change in the likelihood of a Minister from Disagreement between the coalition 
party and the minister when the party holds the portfolio weakly salient (one standard deviation below 
mean issue salience, 2%). 90% confidence intervals are simulated from 1000 draws of the variance-
covariance matrix.  Predictions are from the Conditional Logit estimates in Model 2. Predictions are 
smoothed using Lowess.  
  
